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PEOPLE V. COUNTY OF TULARE
[45 C.2d 317; 289 P.2d 111

[Sac. No. 6640.

In Bank.
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Oct. 27, 1955.]

TIlE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. COUNTY OF TULARE et al.,
Respondents.

.-.... -

[1] Administrative Law-Court Review-Mandamus.-The Legislature in Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, relating to mandamus, has
provided an appropriate method of reviewing acts of a statewide administrative and quasi-judicial agency, such as the
State Board of Equalization.
[2] Taxation-Equalization-Proceedings-Review.-The action of
the State Board of Equalization in ordering an increase in the
assessment of all taxable property within a county affected
by its order is reviewable in the superior court pursuant to
the provisions of Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, relating to mandamus.
[3] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings-Review.-Where the superior
. court, having jurisdiction, had assumed jurisdiction of a proceeding under Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, to review the action
of the State Board of Equalization in increasing the assessment of all taxable property within a county affected by the
board's order, no valid reason appeared why the Supreme
Court should take original jurisdiction in the matter.
[4] Mandamus-Defenses-Pendency of Another Action.-Where
there is pending another mandamus proceeding in the superior
court seeking the same result, involving the same parties and
the same issues, the Supreme Court will generally not assume
jurisdiction.
[6] Abatement - Pendency of Another Action.-When another
court with concurrent jurisdiction has assumed the same in
an action seeking the same relief between the same parties,
the Supreme Court ordinarily will not assume jurisdiction.

..,.-'

PROCEEDING in mandamus to direct Tulare County and
certain county officers to increase the assessed valuation of
all taxable property on the local rolls of such county in compliance with an order of the State Board of Equalization.
Alternative writ discharged and petition denied.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §§ 196, 204 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Public Administrative Law, § 186 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 230; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 767'et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Administrative Law, §19; [2,3]
Taxation, § 208; [4] Mandamus, § 75; [5] Abatement, § 1L
l

.... ..
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Edmund G. Browll, Attorney General, E. G. Benard, James
E. Sabine and Irving H. Perluss, Assistant Attorneys General, and Edward P. Hollingshead, Deputy Attorney General,
for Petitioner.
01

Ralph B. Jordan, County Counsel, Calvin E. Baldwin, Assistant County Counsel, Holbrook, Tarr, Carter & O'NeilJ,
W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., Francis H. O'Neill and Leroy
McCormick for Respondents.
Hutchinson & Quattrin as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
McCOMB, J. pro tern. ·-Petitioner is seeking the issuance
of a writ of mandate to respondents directing them to increase the assessed valuation of all taxable property on the
local rolls of Tulare County in compliance with an order of
the State Board of Equalization dated August 15, 1955.
The order in question was issued by the State Board of
Equalization upon findings made by said board following
a hearing held by it on July 25, 1955, entitled "In the Matter
of the Equalization of the Local Roll of Tulare County for
the Fiscal Year 1955-1956" and conducted pursuant to the
provisions of article XIII, section 9, Constitution of the State
of California and sections 1831-1834 of the Revenue and
Taxation Code.
The board found that the" average ratio of assessed value
to market value of the taxable property within the County
of 'rulare is such that the addition of twenty-three (23) per
centum to the valuation of said county is required to equalize
the assessment of the property contained in said local assessment roll with the assessment of property in the several
counties of the State" and ordered that "the assessed value
of all taxable property in the local assessment roll for the
fiscal year 1955-56 of the County of Tulare, except such
property as is not subject to the laws generally applicable
to the assessment and equalization of property by reason of
specific constitutional provisions relating thereto, be increased
by twenty-three (23) per centum."
Also on August 15, 1955, the State Board of Equalization
notified the county auditor and the Board of Supervisors
of the County of Tulare, and the city council of each city
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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in that county, of its order and directed the county auditor
to increase the assessment of all property affected by its
order by making the corresponding changes in the assessment
roll.
On August 30, 1955, a proceeding was commenced in the
Superior Court of Tulare County by the County of Tulare,
as plaintiff, against the State Board of Equalization, the
members thereof, and the county auditor of said county. In
said action the county of Tulare challenges the regularity
of the proceedings before the State Board of Equalization,
the findings of the board and the validity of its order. On
the same date an alternative writ of mandate was issued in
that action by the superior court, directing the board and
its members to set aside their order of August 15, 1955, or
show cause as to why they had not done so, directing the
county auditor to omit from the county ass('ssment roll the
23 per cent increase as ordered by said board, commanding the
board to show cause why its proceedings, insofar as they
related to the county of Tulare, should not be reviewed according to the provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and ordering that pending the determination of
said action the order of the board be stayed.
On September 1, 1955, the Board of Supervisors of Tulare
County fixed the 1955 tax rate for said county, pursuant
to section 2151 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, computing
such rates without the 23 per cent increase ordered by the
State Board of Equalization. Similarly, on August 31, 1955,
the City Council of the City of Woodlake in Tulare County,
which city collects its taxes on the county roll under the
consolidated system of taxation, fixed its tax rate without
including in its computation the 23 per cent increase ordered
by the board. Each of these levies was made on the last day
on which these entities could levy tax rates for 1955, and was
in compliance with the mandate of the superior court .
. This court issued an alternative writ of mandate returnable
September 30. 1955.
[1] The Legislature, in section 1094.5 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, has provided an appropriate method of
reviewing acts of a statewide administrative and quasi-judicial
agency such as the State Board of Equalization. (Temescal
Water Co. v. Department of Public lVorks, 44 Ca1.2d 90, 105
[9] [280 P .2d 1 J.) [2] The action of the State Board of
Equalization is reviewable in the superior court pursuant
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to the provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (TemescallVater Co. v. Department of Public Works,
supra; Eastern-Columbia, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 61
Cal.App.2d 734, 745 [143 P.2d 992].)
i\lso rule 56(a) (1), Rules on Original Proceedings in Reviewing Court, 36 Ca1.2d 41, provides: "If the petition might
lawfully have been made to a lower court in the first instance,
it shall set forth the circumstances which, in the opinion
of the petitioner, render it proper that the writ should issue
originally from the reviewing court." [3] In the instant
case. application has in fact been made by respondent to the
superior court having jurisdiction and that court having
assumed jurisdiction, no valid reason appears why this court
should take original jurisdiction in the matter. (Cf. Roma
Macaroni Factory v. G1'ambasi1'ani, 219 Cal. 435, 436 [1] [27
P.2d 371J ; Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 205 Cal. 426,
440 [6] [271 P. 487].)
[4] Where, as in the instant case, it appears that there
is pending another action in the superior court seeking the
same result, involving the same parties and the same issues,
this court will generally not assume jurisdiction. (Irvine v.
Gibson, 19 Cal.2d 14, 16 [3] [118 P.2d 812].) [5] When
another court with concurrent jurisdiction has assumed the
same in an action seeking the same relief between the same
parties, this court ordinarily will not assume jurisdiction.
(W. R. Grace &- Co. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Ca1.2d 720,
727 [2] [151 P.2d 215] ; McMullen v. Glenn-Col'usa Irr. Dist.,
17 Cal.App.2d 696, 701 [6] [62 P.2d 1083].)
The exceptional facts presented in Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal.
2d 87 [207 P.2d 47], are not here present. The cited case
involved a statewide election, callable at the governor's discretion, for a special or general election, under conditions
as to whieh he could not act while litigation was pending,
and in such case the parties were not the same. Therefore,
a plea in abatement would not lie. Such is not the situation
in this case. In the present ease none of the special factors
warranting the original writ in the Perry case exist. The
dispute involved is solely between the State Board of Equalization and the county of Tulare. No qnestion is involved
as to the other 13 counties which have been the subject of
similar proceedings before the state board because (a) the
hearings were conducted separately and (b) the order in
question was limited solely to the single county.
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For the foregoing reasons the a1tf'rnative writ heretofore
issued is discharged and the petition denied.
Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

)

TRA YNOR, J.-I dissent.
I would issue the peremptory writ forthwith for the following reasons:
(1) The State Board of Equalization not only had jurisdiction but had the duty under the California Constitution
tv equalize the valuation of taxable property in the several
counties (Canst., art. XIII, § 9; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 1831;
People v. Dunn, 59 Cal. 328, 330-331; Baldwin v. Ell1:S, 68
Cal. 495, 499-500 [9 P. 652]) despite the suspension of
chapter 1466, Statutes of 1949. (Stats. 1951, ch. 1554; Stats.
1953, ch. 362; Stats. 1955, ch. 256; see 18 Ops. Cal. Atty.
Gen. 66.)
(2) There is a compelling necessity for such equalization:
(a) State assessed property (largely public utility property)
and locally assessed property are taxed at the same rate.
(Const., art. XIII, § 14.) To prevent discrimination against
either class of property in violation of article XIII, section 1
of the Constitution, both must. be assessed at the same level.
Since it is implicit in the board's order that it assesses utility
property in Tulare County at a higher level than the county
assessor assesses property in the county, a prima facie case
of discrimination against utility property exists if the assessments are not equalized. (b) The amount of school equalization aid (see Ed. Code, §§ 7031-7038; Report of the Senate
Committee on State and Local Taxation, part Six, March
1953, pp. 15-17) distributed by the state to school districts
depends in part on the assessed value of property in the
district. In the current fiscal year more than $84,000,000
will be distributed by the state to school districts. To prevent
discrimination among school districts in the distribution of
this aid, intercounty assessments must be at the same level.
(c) Equitable assignment of priorities in the advancement of
state funds for school construction and uniformity as to
repayment of such' advances (Ed. Code, §§ 5044.5, 5053 et seq.,
7705, 7725 et seq.), uniform application of tax rate and bonded
indebtedness limitations (e.g. Ed. Code, §§ 6357, 74'31),
equitable distribution of taxes of districts embracing areas
in more than one county (e.g. Ed. Code, § 6381; Health &
.s C.2d-ll
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Safe Code, §§ 14600-14760), and uniform application of householders' and veterans' exemptions (Const., art. XIII, §§ 1%,
10 1/ 2 ) and real property ownership qualifications of recipients
of welfare aid (Welf. & Jnst. Code, §§ 1520, 2164, 3047),
reguire intercounty assessments at the same level. r.J.'hus, if
the board's order in this case is valid and is not enforced,
Tulare County will enjoy a discriminatory advantage with
respect to the matters described under (b) and (c) over the
13 other counties that have complied with the board's orders
to increase their assessment rolls. (d) Should a state ad
valorem tax be levied (see Const., art. IV, § 34(a); Rev. &
'l'ax. Code, §§ 28001-28011), intercounty equalization is essential to insure the same level of assessment throughout the
state.
(3) Following equalization by the State Board of Equalization the county officials had no discretion to exercise with
respect to the board's order but were under a ministerial
duty to obey it. (People's ·Water 00. v. Boromeo, 31 Cal.
App. 270, 272-273 [160 P. 574].) Mandamus is the traditional remedy to enforce that duty. (People V. Dunn, 59
Cal. 328; Morton v. Broderick, 118 Cal. 474, 480-481 [50
P. 644].)
(4) Since the time schedule established by statute for the
delivery of the roll, fixing the tax rate, and the execution
of affidavits is directory and not jurisdictional (Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 24;· Universal Oonsol. Oil 00. V. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 353,
362-363 [153 P.2d 746] ; Ryan v. Byram, 4 Ca1.2d 596, 603-607
[51 P.2d 872] ; Whiting Finance 00. v. Hopkins, 199 Cal. 428,
436 [249 P. 853] ; Buswell V. Supervisors of Alameda Oounty,
116 Cal. 351, 353-354 [48 P .2d 226] ; see Steele V. San Luis
OMspo, 152 Cal. 785, 786-788 [93 P. 1020]), an order of this
court to the county officials to do now what they should have
done will not invalidate the tax levy. Refusal of county
officials to perform their ministerial duties within the time
prescribed cannot frustrate the equalization demande::l by the
Constitution or render this court impotent to enforce it.
*"N 0 act in all the proceedings for raising revenue by taxation is
illegal on account of informality or because not completed within the
rcquired timc."
In San Diego etc. By. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 164 Cal.
41, 43 [127 P. 153), relied on by rcspondents, the assessment roll
had becn delivcrcd "in acconlancc with law." In the present case the
assessment roll has not been delivcred in accordance with law. The
auditor did not enter the changes ordered by th~ board, nor did he
l'ertify that he had "corrected it as required by the State Board of
Equalization." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2601.)
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Moreover, the contention that it would be an idle act for
this court to issue a writ in this case applies with greater
force to an order of the supel"ior court under section 1094.5
of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the delay necessarily involved in getting a final determination of tllis court
following an appeal from such an order. If section 1094.5
affords the appropriate remedy in cases of this kind, and if
court orders would be futile if not made within the statutory
time schedule for completing the taxing process, county officials need only to proceed under that section in the superior
court to prevent the constitutional provisions for equalization
from ever being carried out, for a final determination could
not be reached in such proceeding within the time schedule.·
(5) The fact that proceeding No. 47478 is now pending
in the Superior Court in Tulare County does not bar the
present proceeding. Compelling reasons for an immediate
final determination by this court are present here as they
were in Perry v. Jordan, 34 Ca1.2d 87, 90-91 [207 P.2d 47],
in which a prior proceeding in mandamus was also pending
in the superior court. Although completion of the taxing
process within the statutory time schedule is not jurisdictional, it is of vital public importance that it be completed
as soon as possible to avoid complete disruption of the taxing
process.
The entire record is now before this court, aud only confusion can result from the refusal to make a final determination now as to the validity of the board's order, the identical
question that would ha.ve to be determined by this court
*The equalization of the local roll by the Board of Supervisors
is not completed until the third Monday in July (Rev. & Tax. Code,
~ 1603) and no action can be taken by tIle State Board of Equalization on that roll until after that time. (Koch v. Board of Supervisors,
138 Cal.App. 343, 348 [32 P.2d 163].) The State Board of Equalization sits from the third Monday in July to and including the third
Monday in August, and it is during that time that it is required to
equalize the valuation of the taxable property in the several counties
of the State. (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 1831 j Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18,
rule 2700.) On or before September 1st of each year the County
Board of Supervisors fixes the rates of county and district taxes.
(Gov. Code, ~ 29120.) The auditor must deliver the secured roll
"corrected .•• as required by the State Board of Equalization" on
or before October 1st. (Rev. & Tax. Code, ~ 2601.) One half the
real property taxes on the secured roll and all of the personal property taxes are due November 1st (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2605) and, if
unpaid, are delinquent December 10th. (Rev. & 'rax. Code, § 2617.)
The second half of the real property taxes is due January 20th (Rev.
&, Tax. Code. § 2606) and, if unpaid, is delinquent April 10th. (Rev.
& Tax. Code, ~ 2618.)

)
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following an appeal from an order of the superior court..
Since the jurisdiction of the State Board of Equalization
to equalize the valuation of property in the several counties
is derived directly from the Constitution (COl1st., art. XIII,
§ 9J, the court does not exercise an independent judgment
on the evidence, and the board's determinations of fact are
therefore not subject to reexamination in a trial de novo in
the superior court. Only questions of law are presented,
namely: Did the board proceed without or in excess of its
jurisdiction f Did it commit any prejudicial errors of law
or abuse of discretion f Is its order supported by substantial
evidence f (Covert v. State Board of Equalization, 29 Ca1.2d
125, 131-132 [173 P.2d 545].)
(6) The record discloses that the county of Tulare, after
full opportunity afforded by the board to show cause why
the valuations on the local roll of the county should not be
increased, not only failed to show that the action of the board
was arbitrary or capricious, but failed to carry its burden
of proof or even produce any substantial evidence of the
ratio of the assessed value on the local roll to market value
(see Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18, rule 2704; Howard County
v. State Board of Equalization, 158 Neb. 339 [63 N.W.2d
441, 448]), that the State Board of Equalization did not
act without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or commit errors
of law or abuse its discretion, and that there is ample evidence
to support its order. (Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. County
of Los A.ngeles, 162 Cal. 164, 167-170 [121 P. 384, 9 A.L.R.
1277] ; Miller & Lux v. Richardson, 182 Cal. 115, 128 [187
P. 411] ; Utah Const. Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 654-655
[203 P. 401] ; Eastern Columbia, Inc. v. COlmty of Los Angeles, 61 Cal.App.2d 734, 745-746 [143 P.2d 992].)
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied November 23, 1955. Gibson, C. ~r., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

